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On 16 February 2016, the European Commission presented its energy security package, the first major delivery of 
the Energy Union agenda. The package includes legislative texts (the revised Regulation on Security of Supply 
and the Decision on Inter-Governmental Agreements) and non-legislative texts (the Communications on the LNG 
and Storage Strategy and the Heating and Cooling Strategy). This commentary takes stock of the political and 
market conditions surrounding the proposal, highlighting strengths and weaknesses of the EU’s approach. It 
argues that more attention should be devoted to demand to ensure correct investment signals, which are key to 
the strategy’s success. 
 
The LNG and storage strategy has the objective of making liquefied natural gas (LNG) and storage contribute to 
the diversity and flexibility of the EU’s gas system. Such a role has been prevented in the past by two factors: first, 
the lower EU prices in comparison to Asian prices, which made the Union a residual absorber; second, the 
physical and regulatory bottlenecks in the EU market, which prevented EU regions more exposed to Russia’s 
monopolistic market practices from accessing LNG.  
 
Indeed, it will be up to market conditions to allow (or not) LNG producers to compete with the incumbent rather 
than undercut each other’s shares. Opportunities arise from the declining gas price differentials between the 
Atlantic and Pacific basins, and from a global LNG glut expected to come on-stream by 2025. However, Gazprom 
seems to be well placed to confront this competition, thanks to production and export overcapacity. The declared 
Russian intention to sell more gas via auctions suggests that Moscow is preparing for a price war on the market 
place, targeting North American LNG especially. 
 
Correctly, the strategy does not deem this as a problem if the EU can rely upon sufficient optionality and flexibility 
regarding sources and routes, and emphasises the role of infrastructural upgrade and full regulatory 
implementation. However, it is recognised that this flexibility is not fully rewarded by the market, so that strategic 
investments will rely on the help of EU funding instruments. Future policy action will have to strike a fine balance 
between the overcapacity needed to ensure resilience and the risk of stranded assets. As such, more attention will 
have to be paid to demand dynamics in light of the decarbonisation agenda. Regional cooperation in particular will 
be essential to avoid the subsidised proliferation of national re-gasification terminals, which risks consolidating the 
current situation of member states fighting each other to be an entry point. In this regard, the proposal of 
establishing regional action plans by grouping national regulators should be the driver of efficient decisions. 
 
A more controversial reception is likely to be reserved for the revision of the Security of Supply Regulation. 
Beside a welcome shift towards the regionalisation of security of supply measures, the text includes a mandatory 
solidarity principle stating that the supply to non-protected consumers in a given member state subject to supply 
disruption has to be ensured by neighbouring jurisdictions to which its transmission network is connected. This 
would also imply that if one member state’s external supply choice – which remains a national prerogative 
according to Article 194 TFEU – could put its neighbours’ gas security at risk, it will have to take collective security 
obligations in case of major disruptions. This is especially relevant in light of the Nord Stream 2 dispute.  
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Such an approach takes into account two major problems: the persistent misalignment in energy security concepts 
among member states and the EU’s weak position given a treaty provision that potentially endangers collective 
energy security. However, the top-down nature of the Regulation is likely to meet resistance from member states 
and national regulators. Also, implementation challenges might arise as the text leaves member states some room 
to define what a protected consumer is when it comes to SMEs and essential social services. In any case, it is 
acknowledged that a market mechanism – ensuring that zonal price spreads act as a mechanism of collective 
security - should come before coercive solidarity. This should require the full implementation of the internal market, 
and a larger role for common oversight. 
 
The EU is also likely to expand its role in monitoring commercial contracts. Automatic ex post notifications will 
apply to contracts relevant to the security of supply. A relevant element is the exemption from this obligation for 
contracts indexed to hub pricing, which seems to break the Commission’s neutrality on the price indexation, 
highlighting disfavour towards the oil-linked pricing, which for a long time has been dominating the relations with 
the key EU suppliers  
 
The Decision on Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs) represents a welcome step. The EU will perform a 
mandatory ex ante assessment of the compliance of IGAs with EU legislation. Such a provision will finally ensure 
that investment is no longer wasted on projects elaborated in disregard of the EU legal framework, like those that 
occurred in the past as part of the defunct South Stream pipeline. 
 
All in all, the package does not represent a complete overhaul of the EU’s role in the security of external supply, as 
demonstrated by the fact that no common public gas purchasing agency will be established. The EU essentially 
remains a ‘liberal actor’ in the field of energy security: rather than adopting mercantilist practices towards third 
countries, the Commission strengthens its role vis-à-vis member states’ prerogatives in order to prevent these 
prerogatives from becoming a factor of collective vulnerability. 
 
On a less positive note, the approach remains focused on the supply side, failing to bring into the picture the 
transformative dynamics triggered by the climate agenda. Demand continues to play a minor role in the 
construction of the energy security discourse. A properly strategic view would have to provide a clear response to 
whether there will be a substantial coal/gas switch in the power generation mix, to what extent energy efficiency 
will reduce gas consumption and whether this will only accompany declining domestic production or will also 
impact the projected import needs. Whilst the provisions should align with the 2030/2050 objectives, the 
assumption of demand based on current policies “projected to remain relatively stable in the coming years” 
exposes a general leaning towards favouring diversification over demand reduction, somehow in contradiction with 
an efficiency-focused heating and cooling strategy. Such a lack of clarity raises the possibility of either wrong 
investments resulting in stranded assets or no investments at all, leading to vulnerability. 
 
 
Marco Giuli is a Policy Analyst in the Energy Programme at the European Policy Centre (EPC). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this Commentary are the sole responsibility of the author. 
